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However, the attempts made to design chemical plants with regard to LUP requirements have been 
few, most of which have neglected the role of domino effects in risk analysis of major accidents. To 
overcome the limitations of previous work, first, we developed a Bayesian network methodology to 
calculate both on-site and off-site risks of major accidents while taking domino effects into account. 
Second, we combined the results of risk analysis with Analytic Hierarchical Process to design an 
optimal layout for which the levels of on-site and off-site risks would be minimum. 
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Abstract 
Land use planning (LUP) as an effective and crucial safety measure has widely been employed 
by safety experts and decision makers to mitigate off-site risks posed by major accidents. 
Accordingly, the concept of LUP in chemical plants has traditionally been considered from two 
perspectives: (i) land developments around existing chemical plants considering potential off-site 
risks posed by major accidents and (ii) development of existing chemical plants considering 
nearby land developments and the level of additional off-site risks the land developments would 
be exposed to. However, the attempts made to design chemical plants with regard to LUP 
requirements have been few, most of which have neglected the role of domino effects in risk 
analysis of major accidents. To overcome the limitations of previous work, first, we developed a 
Bayesian network methodology to calculate both on-site and off-site risks of major accidents 
while taking domino effects into account. Second, we combined the results of risk analysis with 
Analytic Hierarchical Process to design an optimal layout for which the levels of on-site and off-
site risks would be minimum. 
Key words: Bayesian network; Domino effect; Land use planning; Multi-criteria decision 
analysis; Fuel storage plant.  
 
1. Introduction 
Early applications of LUP to major accidents in Europe dates back to the early 1970s when the 
Flixborough disaster in 1974 in the UK led to the Act 1974, requiring industries to keep internal 
risks (on-site risks) as well as external risks (off-site risks) as low as reasonably practicable (HSE 
2014). Accordingly, local planning authorities have been obliged to obtain advice from HSE in 
the case of land developments around major hazard installations (MHIs) (Franks 2004; HSE 
1989, 2014). 
The majority of relevant work over the past two decades, however, has been inspired by the EU 
Council Directive 96/82/EC, also known as Seveso Directive II. Articles 8 and 12 of the Seveso 
II explicitly mandates the EU Member States to consider domino effects and land use planning, 
respectively, for the prevention of major accidents and the limitation of their consequences to 
man and the environment. Article 12 is mainly devoted to (i) sitting of new installations, (ii) 
*Manuscript
Click here to view linked References
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modification to existing installations, and (iii) land developments in the vicinity of existing 
installations, particularly those developments which would increase either the population at risk 
or the severity of the risk. In other words, it does not apply to an existing installation unless there 
are any internal modifications to the plant or external land developments in the vicinity of the 
plant.  
Provision of domino effect in Seveso II has been made to ensure adequate internal safety 
distances among the units of a MHI where it is possible that a major accident in a unit propagates 
to neighboring units, triggering other secondary accidents. Likewise, requirements of LUP have 
been included in Seveso II to warrant adequate external safety distances between a MHI and 
residential areas, areas of public use, or areas of particular natural sensitivity and interest 
(Christou et al., 2006). From 1 June 2015, the new Seveso Directive III comes into force in 
Europe, containing the same LUP philosophy as its predecessor Seveso II. 
LUP has traditionally been considered from two perspectives: (i) land use development in the 
vicinity of an existing MHI and (ii) modification/development of an existing MHI considering 
nearby existing land developments. From the first perspective, off-site individual risk or societal 
risks are calculated for an MHI considering major accident scenarios (Laheij et al., 2000; 
Taveau, 2010; Hauptmanns, 2005; Cozzani et al., 2014; Kontic and Kontic, 2009). Accordingly, 
pieces of land in the vicinity of MHI are designated to particular developments based on their 
vulnerability and the levels of risks they are exposed to. The role of domino effects (chain of 
accidents), however, has barely been considered in the calculation of off-site risks (Cozzani et 
al., 2014).  
According to the second perspective, however, LUP requirements have been considered in multi-
criteria decision analysis (MCDA) in order to develop or modify existing MHIs (Papazoglou et 
al., 2000; Sebos et al., 2010; Bernechea and Arnaldos, 2014) such that the modifications would 
decrease or at least not increase the level of off-site risks. In the previous attempts, however, 
either the effect of domino effects has been neglected (e.g., Papazoglou et al. (2000)) or the total 
risk comprising on-site and off-site risks has been considered as a single decision criterion (e.g., 
Bernechea and Arnaldos (2014)). While the ignorance of domino effects could result in 
underestimation of accident probabilities and thus the value of risk, aggregation of on-site and 
off-site risks into a single risk value could significantly overshadow the requirements of LUP in 
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the decision analysis. For example, a plant with a lower aggregate risk is likely to be chosen over 
another plant with a slightly higher aggregate risk even if the former plant might have violated 
the LUP obligations. 
The present study to some extent belongs to the second perspective in the sense that it considers 
LUP requirements to design (not develop or improve) an optimal layout for an MHI. To 
overcome the drawbacks of previous work, the impact of domino effect is explicitly included in 
the risk analysis of major accidents, and instead of aggregating on-site and off-site risks; a 
MCDA technique, Analytic Hierarchical Process (AHP), is employed to account for on-site and 
off-site risks as separate decision criteria. Thus, it would be possible to prioritize plant layout 
alternatives and choose the one which best meets the constraints of the problem without 
compromising off-site risk for on-site risk or vice versa. To calculate the on-site and off-site we 
modify a Bayesian network (BN) methodology introduced by Khakzad et al. (2013). The 
application of the developed BN in conjunction with AHP to risk-based design of chemical 
plants is demonstrated via a fuel storage plant. 
2. Risk-based land use planning  
Several methods have been adapted around the world to implement LUP such as the method of 
generic distances, consequence-based method and risk-based method. These methods are not 
necessarily contradictory, and in most cases a combination of them are employed (hybrid 
methods). Comprehensive reviews and comparisons of conventional LUP methods adapted 
within European countries have been discussed by Papazoglou et al. (1998), Christou et al. 
(1999, 2011), Cozzani et al. (2006), Basta et al. (2007), Demichela et al. (2014), Pasman and 
Reniers (2014).  
The risk-based method includes several steps: (i) to identify and estimate the probability of 
potential accident scenarios, (ii) to identify and estimate the intensity of physical effects1 (e.g., 
heat radiation, overpressure, toxic concentration), (iii) to estimate the adverse effects of the 
physical effects on exposed population, and (iv) to analyze off-site risks in form of individual 
risk (IR) contours or societal risk curves (F-N curve) (Christou et al., 2006). Quantitative risk 
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analysis methods are usually applied to estimate the probabilities of potential accidents while 
dose-effect relationships and probit models are used to estimate the adverse effects of the 
physical effects on off-site targets (usually human). 
Figure 1 depicts a buffer distance comprising three zones separated by IR contours, resulting 
from a risk-based approach adopted in the UK. Circumventing an MHI (Figure 1(a)) or a 
hazardous pipeline (Figure 1(b)), the boundaries of the inner zone (IZ), the middle zone (MZ), 
and the outer zone (OZ) are identified by IR contours corresponding to , , and  
	, respectively (HSE 2014; PADHI, 2011). Land developments inside a buffer zone should 
be limited according to the magnitude of IR and vulnerability and number of population at risk. 
To this end, for example, the HSE of the UK has defined 4 levels of vulnerability for land 
developments: level 1 including factories with limited number of employees; level 2 including 
residential houses with limited number of residents; level 3 including primary schools and old 
people homes; and level 4 including football stadiums and large hospitals.  
 
Figure 1. Buffer zone around a major hazard installation (a) and a pipeline (b) (PADHI, 2011).  
 
Based on these vulnerability levels and amount of IRs, the following decision matrix (Table 1) 
can be used to Advise Against (AA) or Not to Advise Against (NAA) land developments 
(PADHI, 2011).  
 
Table 1. Decision matrix used by HSE for risk-based LUP (PADHI, 2011). AA: Advise Against 
development; NAA: Not Advise Against development.  
 
3. An integrated Bayesian network to risk analysis 
To estimate either on-site or off-site risks posed by an MHI, the probabilities of major accidents 
within the MHI should be determined. For this purpose, the total probability of accident should 
be determined for each unit of the MHI. The total probability of a unit consists of the probability 
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of individual accidents in the unit and also the probabilities of accidents in the unit triggered by 
domino effects, i.e., domino-induced accidents.  
Khakzad et al. (2013) introduced a methodology based on BN to model and calculate the 
probability of domino effects in chemical plants. In their methodology, a primary unit has to be 
identified as the starting point to develop the BN and thus to model the domino effect. A BN 
which is developed this way thus cannot account for all possible domino effects with different 
starting points within a chemical plant. As a result, the total probability of accident in a unit 
would be underestimated since not all the possible domino effects impacting the unit can be 
modeled by the BN.  
To relax this drawback, we modified the BN introduced by Khakzad et al. (2013) so that the total 
probability of accident for each unit can be estimated by considering multiple domino effects 
using a single BN. Figure 2 presents the modified methodology in six steps.  
Step 1: According to safety reports and layout of the chemical plant, critical units are identified. 
Critical units are those with significant inventories of flammable/explosive substances which 
have the potential to cause credible on-site or off-site damages. These units are likely to initiate a 
domino effect or facilitate the propagation of an on-going domino effect. These units can be 
presented as nodes of the BN.  
Step 2: Considering factors such as the chemical characteristics of the contained substance, the 
physical and operational conditions under which the chemical substance is being 
processed/stored, type of release, and environmental conditions, a number of accident scenarios 
can be envisaged for each critical unit. 
Step 3: Using historical data, databases, and expert judgment, probabilities of individual 
accidents (disregarding the impact of domino effects) can be estimated. To this end, accident 
probabilities for a number of units have been calculated and presented in relevant databases and 
manuals such as FRED (2012) and Bevi Manual (2009). The calculated probabilities in this step 
are stored to be later used in populating the conditional probability tables of the BN.  
Step 4: Based on the type of accidents determined in Step 2, the type and magnitude of 
escalation vectors between each pair of units are determined. Escalation vectors are physical 
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effects such as heat radiation and explosion overpressure generated by accidents. Methods to 
calculate the intensity of escalation vectors can be found in CCPS (2000) and Yellow Book 
(1997). 
 
Figure 2. Procedure to calculate the total probability of accidents for a unit. 
 
Step 4.1: For an escalation vector to cause credible damage to a target unit and thus escalate the 
accident, its magnitude should be greater than some threshold values. In other words, if the 
magnitude of an escalation vector is less than the respective threshold value, the probability of 
damage would be deemed negligible. Thus, only escalation vectors which exceed predefined 
threshold values are kept in the modeling.  
Step 4.2: The escalation vectors which were calculated in Step 4.1 will be used as the arcs of the 
BN. Since BN is a directed acyclic graph (Pearl, 1988), it is not permitted to have mutual arcs 
between any pair of nodes which otherwise would violate the axiom of acyclicity. To overcome 
this, when there are reciprocal escalation vectors between a pair of units, the smaller escalation 
vector is eliminated from the BN. Although this simplification is likely to eliminate the 
possibility of a domino effect which would have been triggered by the smaller escalation vector, 
it still holds the possibility of a more probable domino effect between the two units by keeping 
the larger escalation vector. 
It is worth noting that when the maintenance of a larger escalation vector could prevent a cycle 
between a pair of nodes but result in another larger cycle within the BN, the smaller escalation 
vector takes precedence over the larger escalation vector and remains in the modeling. 
Nevertheless, such a situation would be rare due to the prevailing direction of wind in the 
chemical plant of interest. 
Step 4.3: The escalation vectors identified in previous steps will act as the arcs of the BN. Up to 
this point; the BN has qualitatively been developed.  
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Step 5: To estimate the probability of domino-induced accidents, the damage probabilities of 
target units should be calculated. Among methods proposed to calculate damage probabilities, 
probit functions have widely been used because of their simplicity and flexibility. Using probit 
functions, first a probit value, Y, is calculated as 
    , where EV is the magnitude 
of the escalation vector or a related parameter, and a and b are constant coefficients. Having Y 
determined, the damage probability, P, can be calculated as   φ
  , where φ  is the 
cumulative density function of standard normal distribution. 
Step 6: In order to quantify the BN and calculate the total probability of accident for each unit, 
conditional probability tables (CPTs) of the BN have to be developed. For this purpose, the 
probabilities of individual accidents (Step 3) and domino-induced accidents (Step 5) can be 
combined using a Leaky Noisy OR (Khakzad et al., 2013, 2014)  
Using the BN developed in the previous section the total probability of accident for each unit can 
be calculated. Having total probabilities, it is possible to estimate the risks of damage to the 
units. Furthermore, the BN can further be extended to account for off-site risks at multiple points 
of interest. Knowing the total probability of accidents, the magnitudes of dangerous doses at 
different distances from critical units can be determined using the methods earlier mentioned in 
Section 3.1.  
Depending on the type of the target of interest (e.g., building or human) and the level of damage 
(minor or major damage in case of buildings, and 2 nd degree burns or fatality in case of human) a 
variety of probit functions or dose-effect relationships can be employed to estimate the damage 
probabilities (e.g., see Assael and Kakosimos, 2010)  
 
4. Application of the methodology 
4.1. Case study 
Consider a hypothetical fuel storage plant (Figure 3) which is planned to sit near a residential 
area and a hospital. The plant is required to store 24000 m3 of crude oil in atmospheric storage 
tanks. Furthermore, the distances from the centre of the plant to the residential area and the 
hospital are 100 m and 150 m, respectively.  
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Figure 3. A hypothetical fuel storage plant. 
 
The aim is to find an optimal layout for the storage plant of interest for which required resources, 
on-site risks and off-site risks would be the lowest. To this end, six alternatives are considered as 
potential layouts for the storage plant (Figure 4). The specifications of the layouts and the storage 
tanks are listed in Table 2. Also, the safety distances among the storage tanks in each layout have 
been determined based on the volume and diameter of storage tanks as suggested by Flammable 
Liquids Bulk Storage Regulations of Canada (2014). 
 
Figure 4. Alternatives for the layout of the fuel storage plant. 
 
Table 2. Characteristics of plant layouts and storage tanks. 
 
4.2. Results 
4.2.1. Required resources  
In the present study, we assume that only influential resources are the required land to sit the 
storage tanks and the budget required to supply storage tanks. The land can be estimated for each 
layout as the area (m2) occupied by the storage tanks and the safety distances among them. 
Approximate cost of storage tanks (USD) can also be calculated from a variety of sources (e.g., 
www.matche.com). The required land and total cost for each layout have been listed in column 3 
and 4 of Table 3.

Table 3. Characteristics of plant layouts regarding required resources, on-site risk, and off-site risks. 

5.2.2. On-site risks 
To calculate on-site risks (i.e., risk of damage to storage tanks and the loss of chemical 
inventory), plant layouts (Figure 4) are modeled using the BN methodology developed in Section 
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3. For this purpose, each storage tank is considered as a critical unit and thus identified as a node 
of BN (Step 1 in Figure 2). Considering the type of storage tanks (atmospheric) and contained 
chemical (crude oil), the most credible accident scenario for storage tanks is identified as a major 
release of oil leading to a pool fire given an ignition source. This accident scenario holds for 
either individual accidents or domino-induced accidents (Step 2 in Figure 2). 
To estimate the probability of a pool fire as an individual accident (which can also serve as the 
probability of the primary accident in a domino effect), the probabilities of a major release from 
a large storage tank (V ≥ 450 m3) and ignition are determined 1.0 E-04 and 3.0 E-01, 
respectively (FRED, 2012). Accordingly, the probability of a pool fire is calculated as 3.0 E-05 
(Step 3 in Figure 2). In order to calculate the magnitude of escalation vectors (heat radiation in 
this example), the ALOHA software tool is used in the present study (Step 4 in Figure 2).  
The following input data has been used in ALOHA to calculate the magnitude of heat radiation 
at different locations: a wind speed of 10 m/s measured at 10 m above the ground and gusting 
from the north west; air temperature of 15o C; relative humidity of 25%, a clear sky, and stability 
class of D. Furthermore, the diameters of release opening for storage tanks have been determined 
as 0.01 of the respective tank diameter. In addition, the location of release has been decided on 
the bottom of storage tanks, resulting in the worst release scenario. For example, magnitudes of 
heat radiation for the plan layout depicted in Figure 4(3) have been listed in Table 4 (columns 2-
5). 
 
Table 4. Heat radiation (kW/m2) at different locations resulting from pool fires in storage tanks of plant 
layout shown in Figure 4(3). 
 
Considering a threshold value of Qth=15 kW/m2 (Cozzani et al., 2009) for heat radiation, only 
those heat radiations whose magnitude is greater than or equal to 15 kW/m2 are kept in the 
analysis (e.g., bold numbers in Table 4) (Step 4.1 in Figure 2). Figure 5(1) illustrates the plant 
layout of Figure 4(3) in which only heat radiations which are greater than or equal to Qth=15 
kW/m2 have been presented. As pointed out in Step 4.2 in Figure 2, in case of having reciprocal 
escalation vectors only the larger one is considered in the analysis. Figure 5(2) depicts the same 
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plant layout as Figure 5(1) where smaller heat radiations (shown in dotted arcs) have been 
removed. The remained heat radiations are employed as the arcs of the BN. 
 
Figure 5. Figure 5(1) depicts the storage plant of Figure 4(3) along with heat radiations greater than or 
equal to Qth=15 kW/m2. Figure 5(2) shows the final BN where smaller heat radiations have been 
eliminated. Figure 5(3) presents the extended BN to calculate off-site individual risks at hospital (H) and 
residential house (R). 
 
In order to calculate the damage probabilities we employ probit functions suggested by Cozzani 
et al. (2009) (Step 5 in Figure 2): 

                 (2) 
where Y is the probit value, Q (kW/m2) is the magnitude of heat radiation received by an 
atmospheric storage tank, and V (m3) is the volume of the storage tank. The conditional damage 
probability can then be calculated using   φ
  .  
Considering the probabilities of individual pool fires and domino-induced pool fires, the total 
probability of pool fire in a storage tank can be estimated using a Leaky Noisy-OR gate 
(Khakzad et al., 2013, 2014) (Step 6 in Figure 2). 
Having the total probability of pool fire for each storage tank, the value of risk for a storage tank 
can be calculated as the product of the total probability and the monetary value of each storage 
tank, that is, the cost of the tank plus the value of its chemical content. It is assuming that during 
a pool fire the storage tank and the entire chemical inventory would be lost, considering the price 
of 1 m3 of crude oil as 315 USD. The values of on-site risk for each layout of Figure 4 are listed 
in column 5 of Table 3.  
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5.2.3. Off-site risks 
After total probabilities of pool fires for storage tanks are estimated, the off-site risks of plants 
can readily be calculated. To this end, first the magnitudes of heat radiation at residential area 
and hospital are determined. Having this, the probability of death for a human agent, IR, is 
estimated using the dose-effect relationship (Yellow Book, 1997): 

     !"" 
#$%         (3) 
where teff (s) represents a human’s exposure time to heat radiation, and Q (W/m2) is the 
magnitude of heat radiation received by human. In the present study, the exposure time has been 
determined as 60 s. The conditional probability of death given a certain amount of heat radiation 
can thus be calculated using   φ
  . The total probability of death is thus equal to the 
product of the total probabilities of pool fires and the conditional probabilities of death. For this 
purpose, the BN can be extended as shown in Figure 5(3) to account for the total IR at the targets 
R and H. Following the same procedure, total IR for the plants depicted in Figure 5 have been 
calculated and presented in columns 6 and 7 of Table 3.  
5.2.4. Application of AHP 
Analytic hierarchical process (AHP) (Saaty, 2008) is a multi-criteria decision analysis (MCDA) 
technique consisting of a set of decision criteria and decision alternatives. Decision criteria are 
influential decision factors based on which the optimal decision alternative is to be selected. In 
AHP, decision criteria are compared pairwise and weighted according to their relative 
importance to the decision to be made. Similarly, the decision alternatives are compared pairwise 
and weighted against each decision criterion. Weights are assigned based on a fundamental scale 
table (Saaty, 2008), ranging from 1 to 9. The results of the pairwise comparisons are populated in 
respective matrices. The normalized elements of the principal right eigenvector of each matrix 
represent the local rank of each decision criterion and decision alternative. Final rank of each 
decision alternative can subsequently be determined using the local ranks of the decision 
alternative and the local ranks of each decision criterion. Accordingly, the decision alternative 
with the highest final rank is selected as the optimal decision. 
Considering the characteristics of plant layouts listed in Table 3, the most optimal layout is the 
one for which the required resources as well as the on-site (asset damages) and off-site risks (IR) 
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are the lowest. However, in the case of having conflicting decision criteria, which is the case in 
most MCDA applications, an optimal decision is less likely to satisfy all decision criteria. For 
example, to decrease off-site risks of a fuel storage plant with a predefined inventory of fuel, the 
fuel content of storage tanks can be reduced. This, however, demands for a larger number of 
storage tanks which in turn not only requires more resources (such as land) but also increases the 
possibility of domino effects and thus increases on-site risks.  
To find an optimal plant layout, an AHP can be developed (Figure 6) comprising a decision 
“optimal layout”, three decision criteria “resources”, “on-site risk”, and “off-site risk”, and six 
decision alternatives, i.e., plants depicted in Figure 4. The decision criteria “resources” and “off-
site risk” are subsequently decomposed to sub-criteria “land” and “budget”, and “residential 
houses” and “hospital”, respectively. Next steps are (i) to rank the decision criteria according to 
the optimal decision, (ii) to rank sub-criteria considering their contributions to the criteria, and 
(iii) to rank decision alternatives considering their importance to decision sub-criteria and 
criteria.  
To rank the decision criteria against the decision, it has been assumed that among the criteria, the 
off-site risk should be given more priority over the on-site risk, and the on-site risk should be 
emphasized more than required resources. As such, using the fundamental scale table (Saaty, 
2008), the weights of the decision criteria have been presented in Table 5 (columns 2-4). The 
normalized values of the principal eigenvector of the resulting matrix represent be the ranks of 
the decision criteria according to the decision (column 5 of Table 5).  
 
Figure 6. AHP for layouts shown in Figure 4.  
 
Table 5. Pairwise comparison of decision criteria and their rank according to the decision.  
 
Similarly, the pairwise comparison of sub-criteria “land” and “budget” against the criterion 
“resources” along with the pairwise comparison of “residential houses” and “hospital” against 
the criterion “off-site risk” have been listed in Tables 6 and 7 respectively. These weights have 
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been assigned assuming that the initial budget is a more important decisive factor than available 
land (perhaps due to the availability of extra land but scarcity of the budget) while IR at the 
hospital is more critical than that at the residential houses (due to a higher population density and 
relatively higher vulnerability of a hospital compared to residential houses). 
 
Table 6. Pairwise comparison of land and budget according to resources. 
 
Table 7. Pairwise comparison of residential houses and hospital according to off-site risk. 
 
To rank decision alternatives, i.e., plant layouts, against the above-mentioned criteria and sub-
criteria, the problem constraints should be taken into account. Without loss of generality, assume 
that the desired amount of land available for the storage plant is about 7500 m2 ± 10% while the 
available budget to supply storage tanks is 2,000,000 USD ± 15%.  
To set a constraint on the on-site risk, it is decided that the risk of on-site damages should be 
limited to 3.00 E -05 times the sum of the initial budget (i.e., 2,000,000 USD) and the value of 
fuel content (24,000 m3). Considering a value of 315 USD/m3 for crude oil, the amount of the 
on-site risk thus should not exceed     &&  &    '() . 
Moreover, following the risk-based approach of LUP suggested by HSE of UK (PADHI, 2011), 
the amount of individual risks at residential houses and the hospital should not exceed 1.00 E -05 
and 3.00 E -07, respectively.  
In order to explain how the foregoing restrictions can be employed to pairwise comparison and 
weighting of decision alternatives; consider a case where the plant layouts are to be compared 
based on the required land. Since the desired land is 7500 m2 ± 10%, that is (7500-750, 
7500+750), a scale such as the one depicted in Figure 7 can be used to weight plant layouts 
based on a comparison between their required land and the desired land. For example, comparing 
layouts 2 and 3 in Figure 4, layout 2 requires 8100 m2 of land which is 600 m2 more than 7500
m2 but still in the desired range. On the other hand, layout 3 requires 6000 m2 of land which is 
much less than the desired range. Although both layouts do not violate the restriction set by 
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“desired land”, layout 3 is still moderately favored over layout 2 due to 2100 m2 saving in land. 
As another example, consider layouts 3 and 6 in Figure 4, where layout 6 requires 9000 m2 of 
land which is 750 m2 more than the desired range. In this case, layout 3 is extremely preferred to 
layout 6. 
The results of the pairwise comparison of plants according to “land” have been presented in 
Table 8. Similar tables for comparisons with regard to budget, on-site risk, and off-site risks at 
residential houses, and the hospital have been presented in Appendix I. Having the local ranks of 
the plants, the overall rank of each plant can be calculated as shown in Figure 8. As can be seen, 
the most three preferable plants are identified as layouts 6, 5, and 1, respectively.  
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Figure 8. Final rank of plant layouts. 
 
6. Conclusion 
In this study we have introduced an innovative methodology based on BN to calculate on-site 
and off-site risks of chemical plants. The developed methodology is able to estimate the total 
probability of accidents for units of a chemical plant, taking into account individual accidents 
and credible domino-induced accidents. We also illustrated that the developed BN can readily be 
extended to calculate the level of individual risks at arbitrary targets in the vicinity of the plant.  
The developed BN can be combined by MCDA techniques such as AHP for risk-based design of 
chemical plants. The outcome such a MCDA would be a plant layout with specific number of 
storage tanks, inventory, and arrangement, for which the restrictions set by on-site risks and off-
site risks would be satisfied more effectively. The application of the methodology was 
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demonstrated via a fuel storage plant with pool fire as the dominant accident scenario; however, 
it can effectively be applied to a wide range of chemical plants with a variety of hazardous units 
and multiple accidents scenarios. 
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Table 1. Decision matrix used by HSE for risk-based LUP (PADHI, 2011). AA: Advise Against 
development; NAA: Not Advise Against development.  
Level IZ MZ OZ 
1 NAA NAA NAA 
2 AA NAA NAA 
3 AA AA NAA 
4 AA AA AA 
 
Table 2. Characteristics of plant layouts and storage tanks. 
Layout 
Number  
of tanks 
Diameter 
(m) 
Height 
(m) 
Volume of each 
tank (m3) 
Safety distance  
(m) 
Figure 4(1) 2 40 10 12000 40 
Figure 4(2) 4 30 10 6000 30 
Figure 4(3) 4 30 10 6000 30 
Figure 4(4) 6 24 10 4000 24 
Figure 4(5) 8 20 10 3000 20 
Figure 4(6) 8 20 10 3000 20 
 
Table 3. Characteristics of plant layouts regarding required resources, on-site risk, and off-site risks. 
Decision 
alternative 
Layout  
identification 
Required resources 
On-site risk 
(USD) 
Off-site risk  
(Individual risk) 
Land 
(m2) 
Storage Tank  
(USD) 
Residential Hospital 
1 Figure 4(1) 4800 1.65E+06 276.7 2.34E-05 1.02E-05 
2 Figure 4(2) 8100 2.27E+06 295.4 3.71E-05 9.09E-09 
3 Figure 4(3) 6000 2.27E+06 300.4 3.18E-05 2.62E-08 
4 Figure 4(4) 8640 2.35E+06 297.8 2.45E-06 2.26E-09 
5 Figure 4(5) 8400 2.68E+06 307.6 1.26E-08 5.98E-10 
6 Figure 4(6) 9000 2.68E+06 311.3 2.04E-06 2.60E-12 
 
 
 
 
Table
Table 4. Heat radiation (kW/m
2
) at different locations resulting from pool fires in storage tanks of plant 
layout shown in Figure 4(3). 
  1 2 3 4 R H 
1 NA 17.5 61 35.6 4.49 1.15 
2 33.1 NA 4.21 61 1.71 1.54 
3 10.9 2.05 NA 17.5 30.7 1.51 
4 10.9 10.9 33.1 NA 4.02 3.04 
 
Table 5. Pairwise comparison of decision criteria and their rank according to the decision.  
  
Resources on-site risk off-site risk Priority 
Resources 1 1/3 1/7 0.081 
on-site risk 3 1 1/5 0.188 
off-site risk 7 5 1 0.731 
 
Table 6. Pairwise comparison of land and budget according to resources. 
  Land Budget Priority 
Land 1 1/3 0.250 
Budget 3 1 0.750 
 
Table 7. Pairwise comparison of residential houses and hospital according to off-site risk. 
  
Residential houses Hospital Priority 
Residential houses 1 1/5 0.167 
Hospital 5 1 0.833 
 
Table 8. Pairwise comparison of layouts according to land. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 Priority 
1 1 5 2 9 9 9 0.421 
2 1/5 1 1/3 7 7 7 0.150 
3 1/2 3 1 9 9 9 0.335 
4 1/9 1/7 1/9 1 1 1 0.031 
5 1/9 1/7 1/9 1 1 1 0.031 
6 1/9 1/7 1/9 1 1 1 0.031 
 
Table AI (1). Pairwise comparisons of layouts according to budget. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 Priority 
1 1 5 5 9 9 9 0.515 
2 1/5 1 1 7 9 9 0.196 
3 1/5 1 1 7 9 9 0.196 
4 1/9 1/7 1/7 1 1 1 0.032 
5 1/9 1/9 1/9 1 1 1 0.030 
6 1/9 1/9 1/9 1 1 1 0.030 
 
Table AI (2). Pairwise comparisons of layouts according to on-site risk. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 Priority 
1 1 5 7 7 9 9 0.529 
2 1/5 1 3 2 7 9 0.186 
3 1/7 1/3 1 1/2 7 9 0.103 
4 1/7 1/2 2 1 7 9 0.133 
5 1/9 1/7 1/7 1/7 1 2 0.028 
6 1/9 1/9 1/9 1/9 1/2 1 0.021 
 
Table AI (3). Pairwise comparisons of layouts according to off-site risk at residential houses. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 Priority 
1 1 3 3 1/9 1/9 1/9 0.040 
2 1/3 1 1/3 1/9 1/9 1/9 0.020 
3 1/3 3 1 1/9 1/9 1/9 0.028 
4 9 9 9 1 1/7 1/3 0.152 
5 9 9 9 7 1 7 0.545 
6 9 9 9 3 1/7 1 0.215 
 
Table AI (4). Pairwise comparisons of layouts according to off-site risk at hospital. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 Priority 
1 1 1/9 1/9 1/9 1/9 1/9 0.017 
2 9 1 5 1/3 1/5 1/7 0.081 
3 9 1/5 1 1/5 1/7 1/7 0.045 
4 9 3 5 1 1/5 1/7 0.112 
5 9 5 7 5 1 1/7 0.228 
6 9 7 7 7 7 1 0.518 
 
MHI
OZ
MZ
IZ
   
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Figure 1. Buffer zone around a major hazard installation (a) and a pipeline (b) (PADHI, 2011).  
Figure
Figure 2. Procedure to calculate the total probability of accidents for a unit. 
Figure 3. A hypothetical fuel storage plant. 
  
  
   
Figure 4. Alternatives for the layout of the fuel storage plant. 
  
Figure 5. Figure 5(1) depicts the storage plant of Figure 4(3) along with heat radiations greater than or 
equal to Qth=15 kW/m2. Figure 5(2) shows the final BN where smaller heat radiations have been 
eliminated. Figure 5(3) presents the extended BN to calculate off-site individual risks at hospital (H) and 
residential house (R). 

Figure 6. AHP for layouts shown in Figure 4.  
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 Figure 8. Final rank of plant layouts. 
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